Outcome orientation - a misconception of probability that harms medical
  research and practice by Humphrey, Parris Taylor & Masel, Joanna
1 
 
1 
 
Outcome orientation — 
a misconception of probability that harms medical research and practice 
 
Parris T. Humphreya, Joanna Masela,* 
 
aDepartment of Ecology & Evolutionary Biology 
University of Arizona 
1041 E Lowell St. 
Tucson, AZ. 85721, USA 
masel@email.arizona.edu, pth@email.arizona.edu 
*Corresponding author Ph. 520 626 9888 
 
 
Keywords: randomized controlled trial; cognitive bias; medical practice; personalized medicine; 
N of 1; probability  
2 
 
2 
 
Abstract 
Human understanding of randomness and variation is shaped by a number of cognitive biases. 
Here we relate a lesser-known cognitive bias, the “outcome orientation”, to medical questions 
and describe the harm that the outcome orientation can do to medical research and practice. 
People who reason according to an outcome orientation interpret probability as a subjective 
degree of belief that is constrained to consider events one at a time, in a way that is incompatible 
with Bayesian reasoning. Instead of accepting that uncertainty is inevitable, and generalizing 
from the frequency of similar events, the outcome orientation prefers one-off causal narratives. 
In medicine, the outcome orientation therefore erodes support for randomized controlled trials in 
favor of reductionist approaches. The rhetoric of personalized medicine resonates with, and can 
promote, the outcome orientation, by emphasizing how the measurable attributes of individual 
patients, rather than chance or unknowable factors, causally produce each particular patient’s 
outcome.  
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“We are far too willing to reject the belief that much of what we see in life is random.” 
–D. Kahneman (2011) 
 
Uncertainty is an everyday experience in medical research and practice, but theory and methods 
for reasoning clearly about uncertainty were developed only recently (Doll 1998, Hacking 1984, 
Salsburg 2001). Confirmation bias, selective memory, and many misleading heuristics are known 
enemies of the insightful clinician, researcher, or citizen (Kahneman 2011);  but other snares 
worth exposing may lurk in how we reason about uncertainty in our everyday lives. Here we 
draw attention to a cognitive bias described by Konold as the “outcome orientation” (Konold 
1989) — little known or possibly unknown to those outside the field of probability pedagogy — 
and point out how this form of reasoning creates hazards for medical research and practice. 
 
Imagine a weather forecast of 70% rain. Most people round this up to “it will rain”. If it doesn’t, 
you curse the forecaster for making a mistake (if you have cancelled your picnic). Now imagine 
10 days, all of which had a 70% rain forecast. The most likely outcome, given an accurate 
forecaster, is that it will rain on 7 out of the 10 days. But nearly half the students beginning our 
University of Arizona Evidence-Based Medicine class believed that if a weather forecaster were 
good at his job, it should rain on all 10 days (Masel et al. 2015), in line with previous studies of 
statistics classes (Konold 1995). People with an outcome orientation do not interpret probability 
statements in terms of the expected frequency of an outcome when a task is repeated many times. 
Instead, their “goal in dealing with uncertainty is to predict the outcome of a single next trial”  
(Konold 1989). Asked to predict the next 6 rolls of a dice with 5 black sides and one white, 
someone thinking in terms of an outcome orientation fails to consider the 6 rolls as a group, and 
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so believes that the most likely outcome is 6 rolls of black, rather than 5 black rolls and one 
white. 
 
An outcome orientation also changes the way that people value evidence. Konold gave his 
students an irregularly shaped bone and asked them to estimate which of six sides would most 
likely land upright if the bone were rolled like a dice (Konold 1989). Students with an outcome 
orientation were happy to call their estimate as right or wrong based on a single roll and were 
remarkably uninterested in gathering data on multiple rolls, or being given data on the outcomes 
of 1000 previous bone rolls. Instead, they preferred to be given information on the surface area 
of each side, or a technical drawing showing the center of gravity, despite the self-evident 
impracticality of converting this information into reliable predictions. Despite the fact that it is 
straightforward to convert data on previous rolls into a prediction, by simply choosing the most 
common outcome, some felt that previous rolls, unlike physical properties, were not “real 
evidence”. 
 
In a clinical setting, the treatment of one patient is like the roll of one dice. Randomized 
controlled trials (RCTs) summarize the results of many patients/dice rolls, comparing the 
outcomes between groups of patients who are assigned to different treatments. While each 
patient is of course unique, both the known and the unknown variables underlying that 
uniqueness are equally represented in the different arms of the RCT, to within a degree of 
precision effectively summarized by statistical analysis. Because the randomization of 
interventions controls for both known and unknown confounding factors, RCTs provide uniquely 
reliable information about which treatments are effective for which diseases, and are responsible 
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for dramatic improvements in medicine (Burch 2009, Doll 1998). Unfortunately, the statistical 
nature of RCT findings—based on aggregates and not individuals—is persistently unpopular 
among patients and doctors (Burch 2009). Backlash against RCTs puts continued medical 
progress at risk. 
 
The outcome orientation helps explain the nature of psychological resistance to RCT evidence, 
information that may help in defending the role of RCTs. Patients abhor uncertainty about their 
own outcome, and the outcome orientation, unlike a full understanding of RCTs, does not 
demand that they accept such uncertainty as inevitable. What is more, patients aren’t interested 
in whether a particular treatment is the most successful for the average person with their 
condition, the information that an RCT provides. They want to know whether the treatment will 
work for them. Medical decisions are necessarily made with a focus on “the outcome of a single 
next trial”, namely that of the current patient, rather than a focus on a group of patients. This is 
true both for the patient (“will this work?”) and for the medical provider (“what treatment should 
I choose this time?”). This framing of the question in terms of a single trial, rather than a group 
of trials, predisposes patients and providers to reason according to an outcome orientation. Each 
patient has only one life; the patient is Konold’s bone, and the doctor metaphorically “rolls” the 
patient once or several times only.   
 
Patient variability is undeniable. But an outcome orientation changes the lessons that patients and 
doctors draw from this fact. The message from the science of probability is that RCTs are the 
best way, in an uncertain world, to determine the optimal treatment for a patient given a 
particular diagnosis, by generalizing from others with the same diagnosis who were randomized 
6 
 
6 
 
to treatments in order to balance out the effects of confounding factors. Treatments are evaluated 
based on statistical trends in the face of variation. When a doctor does not suffer from the 
outcome orientation, they can use RCT data to reason about the optimal prescribing policy in 
order to maximize the total wellbeing of all patients in their practice, and then follow this policy 
when faced with individual patients. In contrast, use of the outcome orientation leads a doctor to 
focus on hard to interpret individual patient idiosyncracies (the technical drawing of the bone), to 
the point of substantial deviation from the RCT evidence (the history of previous rolls of similar 
bones). 
 
For example, following a recent RCT indicating that steroid injections are ineffective for spinal 
stenosis (Friedly et al. 2014), The New York Times reported Dr. Thiru Annaswamy of the Dallas 
Veterans Medical Center as denying this evidence by saying that “there are patients who clearly 
respond to steroid injection. However, it is unclear why some do, and others don’t” and that a 
particular patient “may have responded to the lidocaine-only [control] injection” (Belluck 2014). 
This indicates a deep-seated belief, shared by doctors and the media as well as by patients, that 
all outcomes have causes. Rather than accept that some outcomes are intrinsically random, all 
patient improvements and deteriorations are seen as “responses”, whether the response is to the 
treatment or to the active placebo. 
 
Dr. Annaswamy may be correct that if the experiment could be repeated, certain patients would 
consistently have better outcomes with the treatment and others with the active placebo. But 
even if he were correct (an assertion for which we have as yet insufficient evidence), one 
measurement per patient would not be enough to know which patient is which. After all, the 
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unique makeup of individual patients is responsible for only some of the variation around those 
trends. Random fluctuations in disease severity in the same patient over time can also make it 
look like some but not all patients “respond” to a treatment. We currently do not understand why 
each patient outcome arises the way it does. In the absence of such understanding, variation 
among patient outcomes is best treated as random, via a RCT. An outcome orientation increases 
the temptation not only to intuit that causes exist, but also to act as though a single measurement 
per patient were sufficient to infer them. 
 
Unfortunately, just as subjects in Konold’s study were uninterested in rolling a bone multiple 
times in order to predict future rolls, doctors as well as patients with an outcome orientation may 
downplay the results of RCTs and look instead to more personalized1 alternatives. Personalized 
medicine resonates with patients, and the urge to offer treatment recommendations that appear 
tailored to a specific patient may sway the decisions of many doctors. Individual patients, and 
their doctors, may see individual experiences as sufficient evidence to justify these personalized 
treatment choices, even in the face of contradictory RCT data. For example, during the 2005 
FDA hearings that helped determine the future of cox-2 inhibitor availability, patients gave 
moving testimonials about how only rofecoxib (Vioxx®) or celecoxib (Celebrex®) gave them 
pain relief, and no other drug (Center for Drug Evaluation and Research 2005). An outcome 
orientation leads doctors and patients to overweight the claims of unsystematic and un-statistical 
“works for me” forms of anecdotal evidence. Even when doctors know better, a doctor’s 
rejection of outcome orientation reasoning can be difficult to adhere to when patients state their 
claims with conviction. 
                                                
1 Here we define “personalized medicine” as “treatment decisions intended to vary among patients with 
the same diagnosis”. 
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The hypothesis that the regular clinical experience of a single patient contains sufficient 
information to guide future treatment can be rigorously tested using a formal “N of 1” study 
design. Patients who believe that they respond uniquely to cox-2 inhibitors would enroll in a 
formal trial to receive a randomized double-blind sequence of cox-2 inhibitors interspersed with 
an alternative medication, and report their pain. This study design would provide information 
regarding both the strength of such personalized claims as a class, and their likely validity for 
particular patients. It is telling that this formal N of 1 approach is rarely pursued, despite its 
suitability for testing common claims of the “it works for me” type. This may be explained by 
the fact that the outcome orientation undermines not just RCTs that average across patients, but 
also N of 1 RCTs that average across time points (i.e. dice rolls) for the same patient. N of 1 
trials can effectively quantify the usefulness of using small amounts of individual-based data to 
personalize the treatment of certain chronic conditions (Guyatt et al. 1986); if successful, they 
can provide medical decisions that are simultaneously personalized, and also evidence-based 
(Lillie et al. 2011). 
 
Despite these benefits, formal and rigorously conducted N of 1 studies remain rare (Lillie et al. 
2011). We argue that this is in part because they are subject to the same rejection of modern 
notions of uncertainty, probability, and frequency as other RCTs. After all, their personalized 
nature should remove some of the objections to standard RCTs, and so create an opportunity for 
patients and their doctors to grasp the role of random fluctuations in their personal “outcomes”. 
The lack of interest in well-designed N of 1 studies, despite their feasibility for many conditions 
even on a small scale, suggests that rejection of intrinsic randomness (associated with an 
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outcome orientation) may be a bigger obstacle to RCTs than lack of personalization. Identifying 
the psychological or cognitive factors that undermine the perceived value of population-level or 
individual RCTs is crucial in order to ensure that medical approaches, whether personalized or 
not, proceed with a sufficient evidence base. 
  
Just as Konold’s students thought they could learn more from the physical characteristics of the 
bone than they could learn from past rolls, many patients seek to open the black box of their 
diagnosis and learn how their unique physical characteristics shape their individual risks. 
Personalized and patient-centered medicine calls for renewed appreciation of individual 
variation, and modern biomedical research has been quick to answer this call by seeking the 
mechanistic and statistical causes of variation in disease outcomes (Hood et al. 2004). Although 
some patients do have very different baseline risks or respond differently to different treatments 
for biologically causal reasons (e.g. HER2 alleles for breast cancer, CCR5-Δ32 alleles for HIV 
susceptibility), results from RCTs on diagnostics show that having more data only rarely helps 
patients (Siontis et al. 2014). Furthermore, expecting causal explanations from precise 
measurements fuels the dangerous argument that –omics derived biomarkers are justified by such 
a compelling causal theory that they do not require RCT-level validation prior to implementation 
(Frueh 2009). This position requires continued pushback, given our lamentable history of vainly 
predicting successful results from phase III trials (Ioannidis and Khoury 2013, Ioannidis and 
Khoury 2011). Unlike the sale of new drugs, the implementation of decision-making based on 
available biomarkers does not require regulatory approval, and so the eventual availability of 
RCT data cannot be taken for granted. 
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Tellingly, Darwin wrote that he had “hitherto sometimes spoken as if the variations... had been 
due to chance. This, of course, is a wholly incorrect expression, but it serves to acknowledge 
plainly our ignorance of the cause of each particular variation” (Darwin 1859). Even in a 
deterministic universe, the causes of particular variations may be not merely unknown, but 
fundamentally unknowable. The promise of personalized medicine to uncover the cause of each 
particular variation may therefore be treacherous; accepting instead the inevitability of 
randomness and uncertainty leads, ironically, to greater knowledge via the acceptance of the 
primacy of RCTs. 
 
RCTs, through their use of a rigorous control group, correct not only for variation across patients 
and variation in the same patient across time, but also for placebo effects, including regression to 
the mean and reporting biases. These attributes of rigorous RCT-derived evidence help buffer 
doctors from being overly influenced by individual patient outcomes. 
 
Even when the gold-standard internal validity of RCTs is acknowledged on these grounds, RCTs 
can be criticized on the basis of their external validity, i.e. that the patients enrolled in the RCT 
may not be representative of the patients who will eventually be prescribed the treatment. Clay 
(2010) offers an example of such a legitimate critique in the American Psychological 
Association’s magazine. However, this author simultaneously objects that RCTs “don’t tell you 
the critical information you need, which is which patients are going to benefit from the 
treatment”, as though this were a reason to use other forms of evidence instead of RCTs. This 
indeed may be the thing that clinicians and their patients would benefit most from knowing. But 
the belief that this can be known, with or without evidence from RCTs, reflects a rejection of the 
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inevitability of uncertainty, phrased in a way that is typical for an outcome orientation. Instead of 
proposing that we solve the external validity problem of some RCTs—by enrolling a more 
representative set of patients—the author instead suggests that the problem would be solved by 
using non-RCT forms of evidence. For example, a phase II non-randomized trial was cited as an 
example of alternative study design, despite the obvious fact that its external validity is no better 
than a RCT. Similarly, multiple observations of the same subject was presented as an alternative 
to RCTs, as though it were incompatible with randomization, whereas in fact it is central to the 
randomized N of 1 study design. Inconsistent critiques such as that of Clay (2010) are best 
explained as post-hoc rationalizations of an aversion to RCTs driven by the outcome orientation. 
 
The harms of the outcome orientation are many. An outcome orientation can convince patients 
that, because they truly are “not a statistic”, evidence from RCTs does not apply to them. It can 
convince doctors that they have failed a patient who does badly despite receiving the statistically 
supported treatment, or that the treatment itself is no good. It can persuade us all that variation in 
the way doctors treat disease, in the absence of evidence and outside of a RCT, is not merely 
normal and defensible, but even admirable and a sign of wisdom and special expertise. And it 
can divert research resources away from RCTs (including rigorous N of 1 study designs) and 
towards molecular reductionist approaches that do less to improve patient outcomes (Horrobin 
2003). Konold’s subjects were reluctant to roll their bones to collect and use statistical data; they 
turned their backs on good evidence in favor of a quest for mechanistic understanding derived 
from precise measurements. 
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Given the prevalence of the outcome orientation among Konold’s students, we expect the 
outcome orientation to be common among the general patient population. Given the way in 
which the framing of medical decisions primes the outcome orientation, we also expect it to be at 
play among pre-medical and medical students. We can certainly see evidence of the outcome 
orientation among medical journalists and the doctors they write about (Belluck 2014). 
Combatting this form of reasoning is crucial for fostering excellence in medical practice, as well 
as helping patients understand their own health and treatment options. Rather than relying on 
unreliable intuitions such as the outcome orientation, doctors and patients alike require 
interventions to develop their intuitions about randomness. 
 
Research is desperately needed on such interventions to combat the outcome orientation at every 
level of education, from K–12 to continuing medical education. Testing the mostly pre-health 
undergraduates both before and after taking our own Evidence-Based Medicine class (Masel et 
al. 2015), we saw an improvement from 3.20 to 2.35 (p < 0.05, paired t-test), which corresponds 
to 17 out of our 40 students giving one fewer outcome oriented response by the end of the 
course, on the mean “outcome orientation misconception” sub-score of the Quantitative 
Reasoning Quotient (Sundre 2003) tool, comparable to the 6 percentage point improvement on 
the 70% rain question that was seen in a previous study (Konold 1995). This is encouraging 
because it suggests that change may be possible. But in order to make a difference, short-term 
measures of improved reasoning about uncertainty must carry through over the long-term, into 
real world scenarios that occur every day in medical settings. Developing reliable metrics of 
reasoning that predict downstream behavior remains a worthy challenge for evaluators, helping 
instructors set goals for their educational interventions. However, in order for the seriousness of 
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this call to be heard, the harms of the outcome orientation must first be more widely 
acknowledged. 
 
In the context of medicine, the “outcome approach” to probability implicitly rejects the entire 
rationale for randomized controlled trials by focusing only on predicting individual outcomes 
and failing to consider frequencies as a property of a group. The outcome orientation undermines 
support for rigorous statistical forms of evidence in favor of anecdotal individual outcomes and 
experiences and a potentially fruitless quest for personalized causes. The goals of personalized 
and genomic medicine resonate with, and can even promote, an outcome approach to probability 
if motivated by implicit beliefs that each variant in outcome has an explainable cause. 
Articulations of the outcome orientation in the media underscore the prevalence of the problem 
amongst the otherwise well educated. 
 
It may be easy to shrug off the outcome orientation in the context of rolling a six-sided bone or 
dice. Perhaps it feels more tempting with a 70% rain forecast than a six-sided bone. In medicine, 
the stark contrast between the individuality of a patient and the nature of statistical evidence 
makes an outcome orientation feel natural, but the outcome orientation is just as fallacious for 
patients as it is for the rolls of a dice. Unless we learn to recognize and counter this fallacious 
mode of reasoning, it could undermine the power and potential of modern medicine. 
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